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ABSTRACT: Although section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act outlaws sex
discrimination in healthcare, its statutory language does not by itself articulate
which actions may give rise to cognizable claims of discrimination. Further, the
final rule implementing section 1557 confirms the recent trend in which courts
recognize that anti-transgender discrimination is inherently discrimination "on
the basis of sex." This Article stands at the crossroads of these two doctrinal
developments, and articulates what sorts of theories of discrimination are
cognizable for transgender plaintiffs under the Affordable Care Act. It does so
by looking to the text of the statute and final rule, as well as reasoning by analogy
from existing antidiscrimination law.
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INTRODUCTION
Transgender' people report severe, systemic discrimination in our nation's
healthcare system. A full 70% of transgender respondents in a recent study
reported discrimination by a care provider in a healthcare setting,2 and 20% of
transgender men and 24% transgender women even reported being refused care
outright. '
Against this background, and a widespread dissatisfaction by consumers
with the nation's health insurance markets, President Obama signed into law the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) on March 23, 2010. With its
"core principles that everybody should have some basic security when it comes
to their healthcare," 4 the ACA issued expansive consumer protections into the
health insurance market. Little noticed in the fanfare, however, were sweeping
civil rights provisions, which marked the "first Federal civil rights law to prohibit
sex discrimination in healthcare." 5 Although the ACA's antidiscrimination
provisions mirror existing civil rights regimes, such as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, few
initially noticed that the ACA-and its implementing regulations confirming that
anti-transgender discrimination constitutes illegal sex discrimination-enacted a
major expansion of antidiscrimination law for transgender people.
This Article does not advocate for changes to the Affordable Care Act, but
rather outlines theories of discrimination that the law and its implementing rule
adopt. In Part I of this Article, I briefly outline the nature and extent of the
discrimination transgender people face in the healthcare system. In Part II, I
discuss the specific legal mechanisms of the ACA's antidiscrimination
provisions. In Part III, I critique a pending lawsuit, Franciscan Alliance v.
Burwell, that has enjoined the ACA's antidiscrimination rule. Lastly, in Part IV,
I explore potential theories of discrimination cognizable under the ACA, using
its interpretive rule and existing antidiscrimination law as guides.
1. In this article, I use "transgender" as an umbrella term to signify a person whose gender identity
or expression is different from that person's sex assigned at birth. I use the term "cisgender" to signify a
person whose gender identity syncs with that person's sex assigned at birth.
2. When Health Care Isn't Caring: Lambda Legal's Survey on Discrimination Against LGBT
People and People Living with HIV, LAMBDA LEGAL 5 (2010),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/when-health-care-isnt-caring.
3. Jaime M. Grant et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender
Discrimination Survey, NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK
FORCE 5 (2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/static-html/downloads/reports/reports/ntds-full.pdf.
4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul into Law, with a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html.
5. Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, OFF. Ctv. RTS., DEP'T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/understanding/section1557.
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I. THE STATUS QUO
Research suggests that discrimination and social stigma are detrimental to
the health of transgender people. 6 For example, transgender people are almost
forty times likelier to attempt suicide and four times likelier to contract H1V
7
than cisgender people, and over a quarter of transgender respondents in a recent
survey reported misusing alcohol or drugs to cope with discrimination.8 In the
medical setting, 28% of transgender respondents reported postponing medical
care due to discrimination, and 48% due to an inability to pay. 9 Further, doctors'
offices, clinics, and other places of care are often unsafe spaces for transgender
patients, leading many to delay or forego care altogether. Even within a
healthcare system that ostensibly prioritizes patient confidentiality and the
importance of disclosure to one's care providers, a recent report revealed that a
patient's honesty about their transgender status to a provider actually increased
the likelihood of discrimination by medical providers. 0
Transgender individuals also experience a variety of negative social
conditions-such as lack of social support, discrimination in employment
opportunities (and thus increased barriers to health insurance), and
homelessness-that correspond with worse health. For example, 97% of
transgender individuals reported experiencing harassment or mistreatment at
work, an estimated 19% of transgender people have been or are currently
homeless, and 15% lived on $10,000 per year-twice the rate of the general
population. " Additional factors such as race, gender, and age compound these
already harrowing statistics. For example, 43% of senior LGBT individuals
responded that they had experienced or witnessed discrimination in nursing
homes or long-term care facilities, 12 and a recent report noted that "the
combination of anti-transgender bias and persistent, structural racism [is]
especially devastating" for transgender people of color. 13
6. See generally Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOv,
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topicsobjectives22/overview.aspx?topicid=25.
7. Grant et al., supra note 3, at 6.
8. See How to Close the LGBT Health Disparities Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/Igbt/reports/2009/12/21 /7048/how-to-close-the-igbt-health-
disparities-gap.
9. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 72.
10. Id. at 73.
11. National Transgender Discrimination Survey: Preliminary Findings, NAT'L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY & NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE 1 (2009),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact-sheets/transsurvey-prelim-findings.pdf.
12. LGBT Older Adults in Long-Term Care Facilities: Stories from the Field, JUST. IN AGING 8
(June 2015), http://www.justiceinaging.org.customers.tigertech.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Stories-
frorn-the-Field.pdf.
13. Grant et al., supra note 3, at 2.
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Health insurance companies have historically discriminated against
transgender consumers by excluding transition-related care, 14  barring
recognition of same-sex partners, 15 and requiring additional documentation for
gender markers,1 6 intensifying an already serious problem. These discriminatory
practices are particularly noticeable in the context of transition, which
historically has been excluded from "reasonable and necessary" care clauses
included in nearly every health insurance contract. 17 However, discrimination
against transgender individuals-through denial of care, inappropriate sex
stereotyping, and providing a hostile care environment-is pervasive throughout
routine healthcare provision. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has observed that "the Affordable Care Act may
represent the strongest foundation we have ever created to begin closing LGBT
health disparities." 18
II. THE ACA AND ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION
Congress has passed various antidiscrimination laws, including the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,19 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title
IX),2° the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,2 1 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.22 These antidiscrimination laws bar "discrimination" on the
basis of certain traits (such as race or disability), and in certain contexts (such as
employment, education, or housing). However, until the Affordable Care Act,
the healthcare system was generally exempt from antidiscrimination suits by
14. See Transgender Health Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/transgender-
health-care/.
15. On March 14, 2014, HHS announced new guidance to insurance companies that stated "that it
is illegal for insurance providers to deny family coverage to legally married same-sex couples if the
company provides family coverage to married opposite-sex couples." Sunnivie Brydum, HHS Orders
Insurers to Cover All Married Same-Sex Couples, ADVOCATE (Mar. 14, 2014, 4:14 PM),
http://www.advocate.com/health/2014/03/14/hhs-orders-insurers-cover-all-married-same-sex-couples.
16. See Transgender Health Care, supra note 14 (warning transgender insurance customers that
they may encounter logistical obstacles to obtaining health insurance, as when a mismatch between one's
legal name and the name on one's Social Security card generates "inconsistencies" or "data matching
issues" that require further documentation and create delays). For an explanation of how increased
documentation requirements for gender marking burdens transgender individuals, see Dean Spade,
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731 (2008).
17. Jillian T. Weiss, The Transgender Tipping Point: An Overview for the Advocate, AM. CONST.
SoC'Y L. & POL'Y 12 (Nov. 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Weiss_-
The Transgender TippingPoint.pdf; see also Liza Khan, Note, Transgender Health at the Crossroads:
Legal Norms, Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare Rejbrm, II YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 375 (2011).
18. Kellan Baker, Top 10 Things Health Care Reform Does for Gay and Transgender Americans,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2012/03/26/11246/top- 10-things-health-reform-
does-for-gay-and-tran sgender-americans.
19. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
20. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
21. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
22. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
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private parties. 23 Further, when a federal statute outlaws "discrimination," it is
not immediately obvious what constitutes "discrimination," or what redress-
private suit, government complaint, withdrawal of federal funds, or other
action-is authorized by law. As a result, an entire field of law has developed to
determine what constitutes permissible versus impermissible discrimination, and
what sorts of burdens of proof are required for cognizable claims. Therefore, the
mechanics of the ACA's antidiscrimination provisions are particularly
important, as understanding discrimination in the healthcare context will require
extending the jurisprudence of existing antidiscrimination law. Analogizing from
these prior statutes and employing the theories identified in the ACA's
implementing rule 24 will be plaintiffs' strongest tools in attacking illegal
healthcare discrimination.
A. The Mechanics of the ACA's Antidiscrimination Provision
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 contains a provision, section 1557, that
outlaws discrimination on the basis of certain traits in the healthcare system.
Section 1557 does not itself enumerate protected categories, but rather bars
discrimination "on the ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(20 U.S.C. 1682 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et
seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794). "25 The
Act also provides that the "Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may
promulgate regulations to implement this section."26
Section 1557 sweeps broadly and applies to any health program receiving
federal funds, including provider settings like clinics and hospitals; insurance
companies that participate in Exchanges; all federal programs, such as Medicaid,
Medicare, the Indian Health Service, and State Children's Health Insurance
Programs (SCHIPs); and any healthcare programs receiving federal funding,
including community health educational programs and nurse programs.
27
Section 1557 also authorizes not only the protected categories, but also the
enforcement mechanisms of Title IV, Title IX, the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, and the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the ACA creates a private federal cause
of action for claimants of sex discrimination; and by virtue of Title IX's extensive
absorption of Title VII theories, the ACA incorporates an analysis mirroring the
23. See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform,
Race, and Equity, 55 HOWARD L.J. 855 (2012) (comparing private suits authorized by the ACA with the
Johnson Administration's desegregation of hospitals using the executive branch's power).
24. See 45 C.F.R § 92 (2016).
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557(a), 124 Stat. 119, 260
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
26. Id. at § 1557(c).
27. See Watson, supra note 23.
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well-developed Title VII claims in employment discrimination, even though
Title VII is not itself mentioned in section 1557.28
Further, on May 18, 2016, HHS published a final rule ("the Rule") to
implement the antidiscrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act. 29 The
Rule, most of whose provisions became effective on July 18, 2016, explicitly
adopts several theories of discrimination, including explicit and constructive
denial of care. However, although the Rule lists particular forms of prohibited
conduct, it does not limit the ACA's antidiscrimination provisions to only those
listed .30 Thus, subjects of discrimination need not limit theories of recovery to
those articulated in the Rule itself. The Rule also clarifies that "sex" under
section 1557 includes gender identity and gender stereotyping, 31 and at least one
court has agreed.32
When courts are receptive to transgender plaintiffs using sex discrimination
theories, Title IX is a potent weapon. 33 Title IX, the landmark sex equality law
enacted in 1972, states that "no person... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal Assistance. 34 Title
IX provides powerful tools, including rights of action by private plaintiffs and
the Department of Justice, and carries an extensive jurisprudence. Further,
transgender plaintiffs may access sex discrimination claims under theories of (1)
improper sex stereotyping, whereby the transgender individual is treated
adversely because she does not conform to what a woman should look like in the
28. Wolfe v. Fayetteville, Ark. Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 860, 865 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gossett
v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001)) ("Courts have
generally assessed Title IX discrimination claims under the same legal analysis as Title VII claims."). The
ACA also authorizes other enforcement mechanisms, such as an official complaint-and-investigation
system via HHS's Office of Civil Rights (OCR). See infra Part 111. But see Order at 35 n.28, Franciscan
All., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 7:16-00108-0 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2016) (doubting that Title VII and Title IX
sex discrimination jurisprudence are identical).
29. See Summary of HHS's Final Rule on Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 14, 2016), http://kff.org/report-section/summary-of-hhss-final-rule-on-
nondiscrimination-in-health-programs-and-activities-issue-brief
30. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,406 (May
18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) ("Because it has been long-established that harassment is a
form of prohibited discrimination under each of the laws cited in Section 1557 and this part, OCR does
not believe a separate harassment provision is necessary and therefore declines to revise the proposed rule
to include one.").
31. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016) ("'On the basis of sex' includes.., sex stereotyping, and gender
identity.").
32. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *27-28 (D. Minn.
Mar. 16, 2015) (finding that "the OCR's interpretation of Section 1557 persuasively concludes that
Section 1557 protects plaintiffs, like Rumble, who allege discrimination based on 'gender identity."'). But
see Order, supra note 28 (setting aside the Rule's interpretation of "sex" as inclusive of gender identity).
33. See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016)
(reversing dismissal of transgender student's Title IX claim), mandate recalled and stayed, 136 S. Ct.
2442 (Aug. 3, 2016), cert. granted, 2016 WL 4565643 (Oct. 28, 2016); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a transgender woman could proceed on her claim that she was
sexually harassed in violation of Title IX).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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eye of the discriminator; 35 and (2) sex discrimination per se, because the plaintiff
was discriminated against "on the basis ... of sex" when she suffered adverse
action due to changes to her anatomical sex.36 Title IX provides a further benefit
to plaintiffs in the form of remedies: although an injunction is the ordinary
remedy, the Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may obtain monetary
damages for intentional discrimination.37 Monetary remedies not only allow the
victims of discrimination to redress their particular injuries, but also are helpful
in bringing about systemic change in the healthcare system, much as tort suits
have curtailed malpractice. 38 Furthermore, because Title IX does not provide an
administrative remedy whereby complainants themselves have standing to
recover, plaintiffs in a private suit need not exhaust any administrative remedies
before filing suit. 39 In addition to a private right of action, Title IX, and thus
Section 1557, also authorizes other enforcement remedies, including a
complaint-and-investigation system under the HHS Office of Civil Rights;
40
enforcement proceedings by the Department of Justice; 41 loss of federal funding;
a future bar on doing business with the government; and false claims liability. 42
B. Current Limitations of Section 1557
If the Affordable Care Act has ushered in a new antidiscrimination regime
covering transgender patients, why does anti-transgender discrimination persist
35. Cf Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[l]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes." (quoting Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)) (internal quotation omitted)); Glenn v.
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11 th Cir. 2011) ("Discrimination against a transgender individual because
of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination.").
36. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Even if the decisions
that define the word 'sex' in Title VII as referring only to anatomical or chromosomal sex are still good
law.., the [defendant]'s refusal to hire Schroer after being advised that she planned to change her
anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment surgery was literally discrimination 'because of...
sex."').
37. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) ("[A]pplication of the
traditional rule... will require state entities to pay monetary awards out of their treasuries for intentional
violations of federal statutes."). But see Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Davis v. Monroe
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No. 97-843) (noting that monetary damages have not been
awarded for lower standards of liability, but rather deliberate perpetuation of discrimination); 45 C.F.R. §
92.301(b) ("Compensatory damages for violations of Section 1557 are available in appropriate
administrative and judicial actions brought under this rule").
38. See Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1224, 1224 (2013) ("Malpractice litigation is not significantly compromising the patient safety
movement's call for transparency. In fact, the opposite seems to be occurring: The openness and
transparency promoted by patient safety advocates appear to be influencing hospitals' responses to
litigation risk.").
39. See Watson, supra note 23, at 878-79.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 92.301 (2016).
41. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,440 (May 18, 2016).
42. Id. at 31,472; see also 45 C.F.R. § 92.301 ("The enforcement mechanisms available for and
provided under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... shall apply for purposes of Section 1557.").
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in the healthcare system? First, many healthcare providers simply will not
prioritize compliance with antidiscrimination policies without a risk of liability
via private suit,43 similar to how school athletic programs remained largely
closed to women until lawsuits famously led to a nationwide expansion of
opportunities.4 4 Further, HHS has only recently finalized regulations to
implement section 15 57, and plaintiff-side attorneys believed that more complex
suits enforcing the law stood little chance of success on the merits before final
rules were announced.45 Critical legal theorists have also observed the limitations
of civil rights regimes in eradicating discrimination, noting that courts have taken
a limited approach to enforcing civil rights statutes and that only the most
privileged plaintiffs have access to the legal services needed to challenge illegal
discrimination in court.46
Moreover, many providers are simply not culturally competent to deal with
transgender patients and are unaware that their conduct may constitute illegal
discrimination. 47 Cultural incompetence is very common; in a recent report by
the National Center for Transgender Equality, nearly 50% of respondents
reported having to teach medical providers about transgender care. 48 These
experiences reflect an intuitive challenge in combatting anti-transgender
discrimination: although most can spot obvious examples of discrimination (such
as an outright denial of care based on gender identity), a great deal of
discrimination is wider and based on ignorance, as when a patient is subjected to
"a hostile or insensitive environment. ' ' 49 Because transgender individuals often
face harassment in medical care settings, theories of discrimination via hostile
care environment will be important in efforts to decrease barriers to care faced
by transgender people. 50  However, although there are limits to what
antidiscrimination law can accomplish, developing the cognizable theories of
discrimination articulated in this Article would undoubtedly curtail much
discrimination in the healthcare sector by imposing costs for discrimination and
incentivizing healthcare organizations to reform themselves.
43. Cf Schwartz, supra note 38.
44. See The Battlejbr Gender Equity in Colleges and Universities, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR. (Aug.
2015), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/bgein-colleges-anduniversities_8.11.15.pdf.
45. Cf Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough jbr Title VII, 63 AM. U.L.
REV. 715 (2014) (noting that courts' adoption of a theory of illegal discrimination has a dramatic effect
on plaintiffs' ability to seek redress); Kellen Baker, LGBT Protections in the AJjbrdable Care Act,
HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (June 6, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/06/Igbt-protections-in-
affordable-care-act-section- 1557.
46. Dean Spade, What's Wrong with Trans Rights?, in TRANSFEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN AND
BEYOND TRANSGENDER AND GENDER STUDIES 184, 186 (Anne Enke ed., 2012) ("Most people who
experience discrimination cannot afford to access legal help, so their experiences never make it to court.").
47. See, e.g., Tari Hanneman, Healthcare Equality Index 2016, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN 9 (2016).
48. See Grant et al., supra note 3, at 72.
49. Transgender Health and the Law: ldentifing and Fighting Health Care Discrimination,
TRANSGENDER L. CTR. 1 (July 2004), http://translaw.wpengine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/99737410-Health-Law-Fact.pdf.
50. See infra Section IV(d).
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III. FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE V. BURWELL
Legal attacks on section 1557-and antidiscrimination law as a whole-also
present a significant challenge to healthcare equality for transgender people. As
an illustration, on December 31, 2016, Judge Reed O'Connor of the Northern
District of Texas issued a nationwide injunction against enforcement of the Rule,
finding that the Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 51 However, the injunction merely bars implementation
of the Rule, so victims of anti-transgender discrimination still may pursue their
claims in court according to the statute, although those claims will likely be more
difficult to win. 52
On its face, the lawsuit challenging the Rule merely appears to be a few
Catholic organizations seeking expanded religious conscience protections and
conservative states taking a swipe at the federal government. However, the suit,
brought by the Becket Fund for religious liberty,53 a conservative organization
opposed to equal rights for LGBT people, challenges the very premise that
transgender people suffer discrimination "because . . . of sex," and therefore
attempts to build case law to create a "transgender exception" to existing sex
discrimination law. 54
After finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court began its analysis by
denying that the Rule deserved deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.55 The court found that the Rule failed Chevron
step one for a lack of ambiguity because "[s]ection 1557 clearly incorporates
Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination." 56 The court then moved to the
"precise question at issue in this case: What constitutes Title IX sex
discrimination? '57 Citing his own recent opinion on transgender rights in
education, Judge O'Connor found that "the meaning of sex in Title IX
unambiguously refers to 'the biological and anatomical differences between
male and female students as determined at their birth.' 58 Thus, the court found
that the Rule "revised the core of Title IX sex discrimination under the guise of
51. 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The Court also enjoined portions of the Rule
protecting from discrimination on the basis of "termination of pregnancy." See Order, supra note 28.
52. See Azeen Ghorayshi, A Judge Just Suspended Obamacare's Transgender Protections Here 's
What That Means, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 4, 2017, 3:32 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/azeenghorayshi/transgender-obamacare-
discrimination?bftwnews&utm term=.grJbrONkxY#.ix46VJ5kML.
53. See Complaint, Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 7:16-00108-0 (N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 23,
2016) [hereinafter Complaint]. The Becket Fund also filed an identical case in federal district court in
North Dakota. See Complaint, The Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Burwell, No. 3:16-cv-00386 (D.N.D.
filed Nov. 17, 2016).
54. See Complaint, supra note 53, at 2-3.
55. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Order, supra note 28, at 28.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id. at31.
58. Id. (citing Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054, 2016 WL 4426495, at *14 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 21, 2016)).
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simply incorporating it," and exceeded the grounds incorporated by section
1557." 9
After determining that the Rule did not deserve Chevron deference and that
the Rule exceeded Title IX's definition of "sex," the court found that the Rule's
failure to abide by statutory religious protections rendered it "contrary to law"
under the Administrative Procedure Act.60 First, the court found that the Rule
failed to incorporate Title IX's religious protections and thus "nullifies
Congress's specific direction to prohibit only the ground proscribed by Title
IX.''61 Next, the court found that the Rule did not pass muster under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, finding that the Rule "imposes a substantial burden on
Private Plaintiffs' religious exercise."62 Judge O'Connor found no compelling
government interest to justify such a burden. Further, even if the government did
have a compelling interest, it "failed to prove the Rule employs the least
restrictive means" to achieve it.63
Judge O'Connor recently set aside the Obama Administration's
antidiscrimination guidance for protecting transgender students, and so his
injunction against the Rule was expected. 64 Conservative commentators have
also already adopted the court's reasoning in the court of public opinion. Noting
that "Obama Can't Redefine Sex," no less than the editorial column of the Wall
Street Journal has heralded the opinion as striking against "the Obama
Administration," which is "guilty of imposing its policy choices by fiat rather
than doing the hard work of democracy."' 65
However, the court's opinion and plaintiffs' arguments do not pass legal
muster. First, the court's assertion that "Congress intended to prohibit sex
discrimination on the basis of biological differences between males and
females" 66 fails to appreciate that prohibitions on improper sex stereotyping have
been at the center of sex equality jurisprudence for as long as it has existed.
Although individuals may have private opinions on what a man or woman should
look like or how they should behave, sex discrimination law takes a careful look
at classifications that tell men and women how to be men and women. 67 The law
59. Id.
60. The Court worked on an expedited schedule, and thus did not reach the constitutional questions.
61. Order, supra note 28, at 37.
62. Id. at 40.
63. Id. at41.
64. See Preliminary Injunction Order, Texas v. United States, No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 21, 2016) (enjoining Department of Education guidance interpreting Title IX as barring anti-
transgender discrimination).
65. Editorial, Obama Can't Redefine Sex, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-cant-redefine-sex-1483488594.
66. Order, supra note 28, at 32 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)).
67. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (holding that a woman who was denied
a promotion for failure to appear feminine enough raised an actionable claim of sex discrimination); cf
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) ("Parties who seek to defend gender based government




views even purportedly benign stereotypes with a cautious eye, because those
stereotypes tend to place the subject "not on a pedestal, but in a cage." 68 As a
result, even the very earliest sex equality precedents recognize that laws barring
discrimination on the basis of sex prohibit not only disparate treatment between
men and women, but also disparate treatment among men and among women
against those who do not conform to the ways the discriminator thinks a man or
woman should appear or act. 69 Thus, for a discriminator to discriminate against
a hypothetical transgender woman on the basis of her transgender status is
essentially to claim that the victim does not conform to what the discriminator
thinks a "real woman" or a "real man" should look like. Such behavior is classic
discrimination under a sex stereotyping theory, regardless of the sex of the
transgender woman in the discriminator's mind. o
In its opinion, the court fails to appreciate this anti-stereotyping aspect of
sex discrimination law. Judge O'Connor states that "even in Price Waterhouse,
the Supreme Court seems to acknowledge the binary nature of sex," citing the
oft-quoted language that "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. "71
However, by essentializing sex stereotypes to merely the "biological differences"
between men and women, Judge O'Connor has misread Price Waterhouse and
much of sex discrimination law. Yes, antidiscrimination law generally holds that
sex classifications may in certain circumstances "take[] into account a biological
difference." 2 However, a problem arises when discriminators assign roles and
responsibilities, envisioning the way a man or woman "should act," and then
justify those stereotypes on irrelevant anatomical facts. Judge O'Connor
commits this very error when he implies that the Rule would likely lead to the
closure of specialty services targeted "exclusively for women (e.g., obstetrics
and gynecology; hysterectomies; hormone treatments; reconstructive
surgery)."7 3 Judge O'Connor errs because he fundamentally misreads the phrase
"exclusively for women." The Rule does not mandate gynecological care for
68. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
69. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that firing flight
attendants for marrying discriminated impermissibly among women by reinforcing the notion that one
must be sexually available to heterosexual businessmen to become a stewardess, thus effectively notifying
men they need not apply); ef Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities,
and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 744 (2010) ("[P]ermitting discrimination
against effeminate men is a means of enforcing the masculinity of the job which, in turn, creates barriers
not only to effeminate men, but also to women who would be interested in the job.").
70. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that discrimination against
a transgender plaintiff constituted unconstitutional sex stereotyping under the Equal Protection Clause);
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Title VII discrimination claim for
transgender plaintiff on sex stereotyping theory); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing gender-motivated violence claim of transgender plaintiff on a sex stereotyping theory). But
see Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (denying a transgender plaintiff relief);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (denying a transgender plaintiff relief).
71. Order, supra note 28, at 35 n.28 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
72. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001).
73. Order, supra note 28, at 10.
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individuals with a prostate and without a uterus, but rather bars care exclusion
for transmen with a uterus. 74 If a care provider refuses to provide gynecological
care to a hypothetical transman with a uterus because of his gender identity, of
course that care provider has discriminated. Judge O'Connor's central extralegal
mistake is thinking of our hypothetical transman as a "biological woman" and
thus failing to see how specialty services "for women" could exclude anyone
with a uterus. Although this is inaccurate and cruel, it is irrelevant.75 Rather,
Judge O'Connor commits a mistake in legal reasoning when he reads Price
Waterhouse as barring disparate treatment merely between "biological men" and
"biological women" resulting from sex stereotypes instead of seeing how
antidiscrimination law bars disparate treatment among men and among women.
It does not matter if the discriminator views our hypothetical transman as a man
or woman; the moment of illegal discrimination is when the discriminator
discriminates on the basis of his nonconformity with stereotypes of how a man
or woman is supposed to act. Thus, even if a clinic views our hypothetical
transman as "a woman," that clinic has discriminated if it denies gynecological
care to him on the basis of his nonconformity with what a woman should be like,
namely his gender identity and presentation. As a result, the Rule does not bar
medical services typically associated with one sex (e.g., gynecology), but rather
bars the denial of care provision because the patient does not look or act like the
discriminator expects.
Moreover, the court conceives of gender identity as a category separate from
sex, much in the same way that the defendants in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert76 argued that discrimination on the basis of "pregnancy" was not
actionable sex discrimination. However, the Franciscan Alliance plaintiffs and
the Gilbert defendants are incorrect in the same way-namely, failing to
appreciate the obvious relationship between sex and gender identity, and sex and
pregnancy. 77 Illustrating this clear relationship, well-respected medical groups
confirm that transition-related care is medically necessary, precisely because the
conflict among a person's internal sense of gender, physical body, and the
expected social roles of their sex assigned at birth can cause significant distress.78
74. 45 C.F.R. § 92.206 ("[A] covered entity shall treat individuals consistent with their gender
identity, except that a covered entity may not deny or limit health services that are ordinarily or exclusively
available to individuals of one sex, to a transgender individual based on the fact that the individual's sex
assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender otherwise recorded is different from the one to which such
health services are ordinarily or exclusively available.").
75. Unless of course the discriminator fails to treat the individual consistently with their gender
identity, see 42 CFR § 92.206, or creates a hostile care environment by misgendering the patient, see infra
Section lV(d).
76. 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination under
Title VID, overruled by Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
77. See Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1344 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("First, as an abstract statement, it is simply false that a classification based on pregnancy is
gender-neutral." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
78. See Chad Ayers, Note, The Need for Change: Evaluating the Medical Necessity of Gender
Reassignment Through International Standards, 18 WASH. & LEE J. Civ. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 351 (2012)
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In other words, sex discrimination against transgender people impedes medical
wellness, which is why the American Medical Association "supports public and
private health insurance coverage for treatment of gender identity disorder,"
' 79
and the American Psychiatric Association "[a]dvocates for removal of barriers
to care and supports both public and private health insurance coverage for gender
transition treatment." 80
Second, the order is deficient in its vision of what constitutes religious liberty
and medical standards of care. The private plaintiffs do "not believe that
transition-related procedures are ever in the best interests of [] patients and
providing or covering any transition-related service would violate their deeply
held religious beliefs. ' 81 Thus, the private plaintiffs argue that the Rule violates
not only their sincerely held religious beliefs but also their medical duties. In
addition, the state plaintiffs seek to set aside the Rule because the regulation
"undermines the longstanding sovereign power of the States to .. .ensure
appropriate standards of medical judgment" and forces a doctor to provide care
"even if a doctor believes such procedures are harmful to the patient."82
Of course, what constitutes the standard of care is a commonly litigated
question in healthcare law. Although a physician must "meet the standard of skill
possessed generally by others practicing in his field under similar
circumstances," 83 common practice "strictly ... is never its measure" because "a
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available"
practices. 84 Thus the appropriate standard of care for a patient is generally a
question to be determined in each case, with the reasonable ordinary physician
serving as the guidepost. As a result, a physician may give her medical opinion
(comparing European and American approaches to "medical necessity" of transition-related care). Should
the courts find that sex discrimination prohibitions only apply to cisgender people, Congress could
overturn the interpretation by legislating that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of
gender identity.
79. Proessional Organization Statements Supporting Transgender People in Health Care,
LAMBDA LEGAL (May 25, 2016),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/11-trans-professional-statements.
rtf.pdf
80. Press Release, Transgender L. Ctr., APA Releases Official Positions Supporting Access to Care
and the Rights of Transgender and Gender Variant Persons (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/1717. Some federal courts have also recognized that gender-
appropriate transition care is medically necessary. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1 st Cir. 2014)
(en bane) (indicating that a total denial of gender-appropriate transition care could fall below "society's
minimum standards of decency"); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011) (striking down a ban on
transition-related care for prisoners on Equal Protection grounds).
81. Order, supra note 28, at 9 (quoting Complaint, supra note 53, at 37-38).
82. Complaint, supra note 53, at 3.
83. McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (S.C. 1995); see also Johnston v. St. Francis Med.
Ctr., 35-236 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/31/01) ("A physician is not held to a standard of absolute precision; rather
his conduct and judgment are evaluated in terms of reasonableness under the circumstances existing when
his professional judgment was exercised."); Hall v. Hilburn, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985) ("[Wlhen a
physician undertakes to treat a patient, he takes on an obligation enforceable at law to use minimally sound
medical judgment and render minimally competent care in the course of services he provides.").
84. The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
662 (1932).
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to a patient, and still violate tort law, if her medical opinion is not in line with
the established standard of care. In a similar fashion, the categorical denial of all
transition-related care for every patient in every circumstance likely constitutes
discrimination as a matter of law if the physician makes that harmfulness
determination based on non-medical factors, such as an opinion regarding
transition, even if sincerely held.
Moreover, this categorical exclusion based on non-medical factors raises a
significant and dangerous Palmore problem of secondary discrimination. In
Palmore v. Sidoti, a Florida family court judge awarded child custody in a
divorce action to the child's white father, instead of the child's white mother,
who had begun cohabitating with a black man. 85 The family court judge made
this custody determination not based on his own prejudice, but rather by noting
that under the purportedly neutral best interests of the child standard, the child
would suffer social stigma from living in an interracial household. The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the family court judge, noting that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a court from "giv[ing] ... effect" to private biases.86
In a similar fashion, antidiscrimination law bars secondary discrimination,
wherein the discriminator points not to his own bias, but rather to a purportedly
neutral alternative standard, such as the preference of a third party. For example,
an airline cannot fire stewardesses when they marry and avoid liability by stating
that it has no prejudice, but rather that customers prefer stewardesses to appear
sexually available. 87
Just as the Florida family court judge could not incorporate private biases
into the neutral best interests of the child standard and an airline could not avoid
liability by pointing to customer preference, a medical institution cannot ipso
facto incorporate private biases into science-based medical determinations. If the
provider refuses to perform a legal duty to provide medical care according to
established professional standards because of private biases, that provider has
acted illegally. By arguing that a discriminator may justify its discrimination
based on neutral principles of medical judgment, which in actuality are a cover
for its own private biases, the plaintiffs argument opens a loophole in
antidiscrimination law big enough to swallow most liability.
A provider cannot state the magic words "in our professional judgment" and
hope to avoid liability if it has not in actuality based that opinion on sound
medical principles, which overwhelmingly support care in accordance with a
transgender patient's true gender and sense of self.88 Of course, this principle
85. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
86. Id. at 433.
87. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Title VII and
rejecting the airline's contention that it rejected male applicants because of customers' ostensible gender
preferences).
88. See American Psychological Association, Guidelines fbr Psychological Practice With




does not mean that every transition-related medical procedure must be provided
to every patient seeking it, but rather that an institution must provide care in
accordance with sound medical judgment in line with professional standards of
care-just as with all medicine. If a white storeowner can refuse to hire an
African-American clerk and evade employment discrimination law by citing not
his own biases, but rather customer preference or the tenets of his religion, then
every discriminator will use that loophole. Although the plaintiffs attempt to
mimic the argument raised in Hobby Lobby 89 by arguing that that federal law
bars mandatory care provision violating their sincerely held religious beliefs,
such an argument presents a severe and fundamental challenge to
antidiscrimination law as a whole by opening an avenue for secondary
discrimination, and courts should pause before giving it effect. 90
Finally, the complaint makes a passionate argument on federalism grounds,
asserting that the rule "exposes the States to litigation by its employees and
patients, despite the fact that neither Congress nor the States expressed any
interest to waive the States' sovereign immunity in this area." 9 1 However, the
ACA explicitly incorporates Title IX's enforcement remedies, and so the ACA
likely abrogates state immunity, ordinarily protected by the Eleventh
Amendment in suits by the federal government and private plaintiffs.92 The
abrogation incorporated into the Affordable Care Act is unambiguous: Congress
imposed conditions on states receiving federal funds under Title IX and the
Affordable Care Act, and, by abrogating states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity, Congress put states on notice that accepting federal funds waived their
constitutional immunity to discrimination suits. 93 Further, this waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity to discrimination suits is valid under the
Spending Clause of Article I and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment's
89. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby), 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764-67 (2014) (holding
that HHS regulation imposing mandatory contraception coverage is illegal under RFRA as applied to
closely held corporations).
90. Accord Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (2013) (holding that the U.S. Constitution
does not prevent a claim under the New Mexico Human Rights Act against Christian wedding
photographers for refusal to provide services to gay couple), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
91. Complaint, supra note 53, at 3-4. The Court worked on an "expedited briefing schedule," and
thus "[did] not reach Plaintiffs' constitutional arguments or Defendants' constitutional defenses." Order,
supra note 28, at 28 n.20.
92. See Lane v. Penn, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996) (stating in dicta that Congress intended to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of Title IX); see also Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1986, 42 U.S.C. § 200d-7 (2012) ("A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of ... title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 ....").
93. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65, 72-73 (1996) (holding that, without a
waiver of immunity, Congress cannot abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when it
legislates pursuant to Article 1); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Congress
can abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when it legislates pursuant to Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of waiver of immunity); see also Title IX Legal Manual, U.S.
DEP'T JUST., at VIII(D), https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#D (stating the Department of Justice's
position that states have waived Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX).
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authorization of Congress to enact "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause.
94
The state plaintiffs also argue that the Rule "undermines the longstanding
sovereign power of the States to . . . ensure appropriate standards of medical
judgment," and thus violates federalism principles. 95 The federal system does
generally delegate the regulation of medical professions to the states. 96 However,
the Rule does not regulate standards of care; rather, it simply states that care
providers cannot deviate from established standards of care because a patient has
a characteristic protected by section 1557. Thus the Rule differs categorically
from a situation like that giving rise to the case Gonzales v. Oregon, in which the
federal government impermissibly changed a medical standard of care by fiat. 97
IV. LEGAL THEORIES OF HEALTHCARE DISCRIMINATION
Although the ACA states that "an individual shall not, on the basis of any
ground prohibited under [Title VI, Title IX, the Age Discrimination Act, or
Section 504], be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of
which is receiving Federal financial assistance," the Act does not define what
constitutes discrimination.9" As a result, regulators and advocates will need to
construct cognizable theories of discrimination. The question of what exactly
could constitute discrimination or participation exclusion in healthcare, an
inherently technically complex and individualized field, poses a further problem
for antidiscrimination law. Without such legal theorizing by regulators,
attorneys, and commentators, courts often struggle to identify the boundaries of
existing antidiscrimination law; for example, in Minnesota in 2001, two courts
interpreting the state's transgender-inclusive Human Rights Act came to
different conclusions on such a basic issue as the ability of employees to use an
on-site bathroom. 99
94. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also Melanie Hochberg, Protecting
Students Against Peer Sexual Harassment: Congress 's Constitutional Powers to Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 235 (1999) (arguing that Title IX was passed pursuant to both the Spending Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment).
95. Complaint, supra note 53, at 3.
96. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) ("The structure and limitations of
federalism ... allow the states great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons." (internal citations omitted)); Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) ("The police power of the States extends to the regulation of certain
trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the public health.").
97. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243 (striking down on statutory grounds the Attorney General's
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act as barring physician-assisted suicide, thus effectively
barring the Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
98. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557(a), 124 Stat. 119, 260
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
99. Compare Cruzan v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch. Sys., 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Minn. 2001)
(holding that an employer that allowed a transgender employee to use a gender-appropriate bathroom did
not create a hostile work environment for cisgender employees), with Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717,
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This Section theorizes how antidiscrimination advocates can take the ACA
into court. First, I show that section 1557 authorizes lawsuits to remedy
discrimination against private parties. Next, I articulate three theories of
discrimination cognizable under the ACA, using existing antidiscrimination
jurisprudence as a guide.
A. Section 155 7's Implied Cause of Action
Title IX precedents strongly suggest that a private cause of action exists
under the ACA, and at least one district court has agreed. 100 The implementing
final rule also authorizes a private right of action in line with existing federal
civil rights laws. 101
In determining whether a private right of action exists, courts look first to a
plain reading of the statute, searching for evidence of congressional intent that
"the statute manifests an intent 'to create not just a private right but also a private
remedy.""102 The plain language of section 1557 states that the "enforcement
mechanisms provided for and available under ... title IX ... shall apply for
purposes of violations of"103 section 1557. The Supreme Court has held that Title
IX is phrased "with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class,"'1 4 thus
implying a cause of action. Therefore, because the language of section 1557
includes the same kind of "rights-creating language"' 1 5 that is present in the
enforcement mechanisms of Title IX, those private rights of action are carried
over into the ACA.
Critics may argue that Alexander v. Sandoval, which held that Title VI did
not authorize a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations
because it authorized other alternative mechanisms, cuts against a private right
of action under section 1557, because the ACA also authorizes alternative
mechanisms of civil rights enforcement. 06 However, congressional intent in
section 1557 appears to be very clear-to adopt the rights and remedies of the
antecedent antidiscrimination statutes, including Title X. Further, when
721 (Minn. 2001) (holding that a company policy preventing transgender people from using gender-
appropriate bathrooms was not illegal discrimination based on sexual orientation).
100. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D. Minn.
Mar. 16, 2015) ("Congress intended [in the ACA] to create a new, health-specific, antidiscrimination
cause of action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless of a plaintiffs protected class status.").
101. 45 C.F.R. § 92.302(d) (2016) ("An individual or entity may bring a civil action to challenge a
violation of Section 1557 or this part in a United States District Court in which the recipient or State-based
Marketplace is found or transacts business.").
102. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 286 (2001)).
103. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1557(a), 124 Stat. 119,
260 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
104. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979).
105. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (quotation omitted).
106. See id. at 290 ("The express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule suggests
that Congress intended to preclude others.").
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Congress enacted the antecedent civil rights statutes referenced in the statute, it
envisioned both public and private enforcement.1 °7 Congress re-enacted
language interpreted by the Court to be rights-creating, a fact the Court has noted
confers private causes of action.' 08 In oft-quoted language, the Court found that
a plaintiff in a civil rights action was seen to act "not for himself alone but also
as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of
the highest priority."°109
Hence, the congressional re-enactment of Title IX's language in the ACA
indicates legislative intent to adopt an implied cause of action into the ACA for
sex discrimination claims." 0 Congresst"' and the courts1 2 broadly construe re-
enactment of "enforcement mechanisms" to include both administrative
remedies, such as the Office of Civil Rights' complaint-and-investigation
system, as well as private litigation.11 3 Although the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR) at HHS has already responded to complaints of sex discrimination under
a gender identity theory,' 14 OCR's small budget and staff cannot possibly take
on the mighty task of effectuating congressional policy to eradicate sex
discrimination in the healthcare system.
Having established that section 1557 authorizes a private cause of action to
remedy illegal discrimination in the courts, the next three sections focus on
cognizable theories of discrimination in the healthcare context.
107. See, e.g., Drew S. Days ll, "Feedback Loop": The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Progeny,
49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 1000 (2005) ("Congress envisioned.., a 'public-private nexus' in which some
combination of federal administrative action, suits by the Department of Justice or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and litigation initiated by private parties would make for a most effective
combination of enforcement mechanisms.").
108. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 288 (interpreting congressional re-enactment of rights-creating
language in an initial statute to be relevant to the question of rights-creating language in a subsequent
statute).
109. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
110. See WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1042 (4th ed. 2007) ("[T]he Court should generally be reluctant
to imply causes of action to enforce federal statutes, but not when Congress has relied on that
understanding in subsequent legislation." (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77-78
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))); see also Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Hous.
Auth. of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 425 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new law
incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute." (quoting Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978))).
111. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(v) (2012) (expressing congressional intent to establish
"accessible, expeditious, and effective civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement mechanisms").
112. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 360 (1992) (analyzing "enforcement mechanisms"
under the Adoption Act, which includes a private right of action and gives the Secretary of Health and
Human Services authority to punish non-compliant recipients).
113. See, e.g., Sindram v. Fox, 374 Fed. App'x 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2010) ("The ADA's enforcement
mechanism includes federal agency oversight and [implies] a private cause of action for injunctive
relief ... ").
114. OCR EnJbrcement Under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act Sex Discrimination Cases,




B. Denial of Care
Explicit denial of care to a patient on the basis of gender identity is the most
obvious theory of illegal discrimination under the ACA, as the Rule explicitly
states. 115 The Rule foresees this sort of discrimination and bars it, mandating that
covered entities "treat individuals consistent with their gender identity,"' 16 and
requiring that covered entities not "[h]ave or implement a categorical coverage
exclusion or limitation for all health services related to gender transition," or
"[o]therwise deny or limit coverage, deny or limit coverage of a claim, or impose
additional cost sharing or other limitations or restrictions on coverage, for
specific health services related to gender transition if such denial, limitation, or
restriction results in discrimination against a transgender individual."" 7 Federal
courts have only recently had the opportunity to interpret the Rule, as few cases
have been filed alleging discrimination on this theory. 18 However, outright
refusal of care would most likely qualify as discrimination via exclusion from a
health program or activity in the same way that refusing to admit a woman to
medical school solely because she is a woman constitutes exclusion from
participation on the basis of sex. 119 This theory would apply to famous cases like
that of Tyra Hunter, a transgender woman who died after being injured in a car
accident because she was refused emergency medical care while lying in a pool
of her own blood. '20
However, denial of care may also occur in disparate treatment cases in which
transgender individuals are provided inferior or delayed care because of their
transgender status. One such case, Rumble v. Fairview Health Services, is
currently in litigation. In Rumble, the plaintiff alleges that his care provider
provided delayed care and a hostile and embarrassing medical exam, and outed
him as a transgender man. '21 In denying the defendant's motion for dismissal,
the district court adopted such a disparate treatment theory of discrimination,
finding that "these facts demonstrate that the alleged mistreatment rises to the
level of the denial of benefits of appropriate medical care." 1
22
115. 45 C.F.R. § 92.206 (2016) (providing that a covered entity "shall provide individuals equal
access to its health programs or activities without discrimination on the basis of sex").
116. Id.
117. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(4)-(5) (2016).
118. Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (characterizing New York
Medicaid's bar on transition coverage for minors as an age-based-not sex-based--classification),
superseded by regulation, 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 505.2(l); Robinson v. Dignity Health, No. 16-03035 (N.D.
Cal. filed June 6, 2016).
119. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
120. Allison Klein, Victims Slain for Nonconformity, Report Says, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/14/AR2006121401917.html.
121. See Complaint, Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-02037, 2015 WL 1197415 (D.
Minn. Mar. 16, 2015); cf Complaint, Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 14-
cv-04456).
122. Rumble, 2015 WL 1197415, at *16.
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Of course, denial of care can be systemic as well as individualized. For
example, insurance policies that exclude medically appropriate care related to
transition constitute discrimination. 123 As a result, many health insurance
companies have lifted prohibitions on paying for transition-related care,
including government-run insurance regimes like Medicare.' 24 However, some
health plans continue to exclude transition-related care, and the ACLU recently
filed a case, Robinson v. Dignity Health, seeking redress for a health system's
categorical exclusion of transition-related care. 25
C. Anti-Stereotyping and Constructive Denial of Care
In contrast to an explicit denial-of-care claim, a care provider may
constructively deny care to a patient by applying inappropriate standards of care.
This sort of claim finds its home in sex discrimination law's anti-stereotyping
theory. 1
26
For example, when a transgender woman begins hormone replacement
therapy, any sudden disruption of that regimen can have dire medical
consequences. Imagine a clinic that refuses to give our fictional patient feminine
hormones, and instead provides her with "appropriate" levels of male hormones
that match her male-assigned body. Our fictional clinic may cite medical
standards of care of endocrinology indicating that female hormones in high levels
are inappropriate for a male-assigned body.
Our fictional plaintiff has a claim for discrimination against the clinic under
a sex stereotyping theory. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
impermissible sex stereotyping constitutes sex discrimination, that
generalizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for
most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and
capacity place them outside the average description." 2 7 Congress was motivated
by similar concerns in enacting antidiscrimination laws on the basis of sex: "in
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment between
women and men resulting from sex stereotypes."' 28 Under the anti-sex
stereotyping theory, civil rights law disapproves policies that seek to tell
123. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.207(b)(5) (2016) ("[A] covered entity shall not.., deny or limit coverage
of a claim, or impose additional cost sharing or other limitations or restrictions on coverage, for specific
health services related to gender transition if such denial, limitation, or restriction results in discrimination
against a transgender individual.").
124. Miranda Leitsinger, Sex Reassignment Surgery at 74: Medicare Win Opens Door for
Transgender Seniors, NBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sex-
reassignment-surgery-74-medicare-win-opens-door-transgender-seniors-n276986.
125. Complaint, Robinson v. Dignity Health, No. 3:16-cv-03035 (N.D. Cal. filed June 06, 2016).
126. In addition to individual discrimination claims, anti-transgender discrimination as a whole can
be categorically conceptualized as sex discrimination under a sex-stereotyping theory. See supra Part ll.
127. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996).
128. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).
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individuals how their gender "should act" or "should look," even if based on
purportedly "benign" stereotypes. 129 The anti-stereotyping component of illegal
sex discrimination not only protects against disparate treatment between men and
women, but also among men and among women. Congress aims to eradicate
illegal sex discrimination by preventing powerful institutions (including
employers, educational facilities, and medical clinics) from pushing those in their
charge (workers, students, patients) into stereotypical notions of what it means
to be a man or a woman. So, a male individual who is "harassed because he
[does] not conform to [his employer's] vision of how a man should look, speak,
and act" is the victim of illegal sex discrimination, not because he is male, but
because of the sort of male he is or appears to be. 1
30
So, although there is nothing per se illegal about the publication of sex-
appropriate hormonal standards of care, our fictional clinic has applied these
standards inappropriately in order to force our fictional patient into stereotypical
notions of what a "real" female body does or does not look like. Our hypothetical
is largely drawn from a test case, Taylor v. Lystila, that was dismissed when the
plaintiff passed away.' 3' In the complaint, the plaintiff, Naya Grace Taylor, a
transgender woman, alleged that her primary care physician, Dr. Aja Lystila,
"consistently refused to provide Naya any transition-related care."132 Dr. Lystila
refused to supervise hormonal treatment for Taylor, claiming a lack of
experience in transition-related care, even though the clinic regularly supervises
hormonal care for cisgender patients. Eventually, the clinic claimed that it did
"not have to treat 'people like you,"' because of religious beliefs held by
employees of the clinic. "3 The clinic further refused to provide a "bridging"
prescription to allow Taylor to find another suitable clinic, creating additional
medical problems. 1
34
The complaint opens by referencing the standards of care the plaintiff
considers to be appropriate. This is not a minor point. Rather, noting what the
patient considers appropriate is very important because it allows us to see the
sort of illegal sex stereotyping that lies at the heart of the alleged discrimination.
So, although Taylor does not use the words "sex stereotyping," her complaint
looks to standards for transgender patients promulgated by the World
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH),135 and not, for
example, cisgender-specific standards published by the American College of
129. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) ("Traditionally, such discrimination
was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.").
130. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) ("[N]othing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and defendant... are of the same sex.").
131. Complaint, Taylor v. Lystila, No. 14 Civ. 02072 (C.D. Ill. filed Apr. 15, 2014).
132. ld. at 31.
133. Id. at 24, 27, 33.
134. [d. at 25.
135. Id. at 19.
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Endocrinology (ACE). '36 This indicates an emphasis on care in accordance with
her gender identity, a medical aim that a reasonable physician would likely seek,
after consultation with Taylor about her health. So, although the ACE might
promulgate standards of care indicating that intense hormone therapy is
inappropriate for a cisgender patient, WPATH's standards for transition-related
care are likely more medically appropriate for a transgender patient undergoing
transition. Thus, Taylor essentially alleges that her care providers committed
illegal sex discrimination by forcing her into accepting a hormone regimen to
make her body more stereotypically male, and refusing her care that would align
better with her actual gender. As a result, the clinic has violated a legal duty by
relying on personal opinions regarding gender instead of making a professional
judgment based on sound medical principles.
The Final Rule prohibits this kind of discrimination, noting that
a covered entity shall not ... deny or limit ... health services that are
ordinarily or exclusively available to individuals of one sex, to a
transgender individual based on the fact that the individual's sex
assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender otherwise recorded in a
medical record or a health insurance plan is different from the one to
which such health services are ordinarily or exclusively available. 137
This provision of the Rule bars the sort of discrimination that Taylor experienced
by preventing the use of gender-inappropriate standards.
D. Hostile Care Environment
Just as racial or sexual harassment in educational and employment
environments constitutes illegal discrimination, a hostile care environment for
transgender patients constitutes cognizable discrimination under the ACA. 138
Although the final rule does not include an explicit harassment provision, HHS
notes that "OCR interprets the final rule to prohibit all forms of unlawful
harassment based on a protected characteristic." 139 Much in the same way that
"it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the
employer's authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on
subordinates," 40 a care provider is not only charged with administering care, but
136. However, endocrinology organizations are increasingly publishing standards on transgender
care. See Wylie C. Hembree et al., Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine Society
Clinical Practice Guideline, 94 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3132, 3134 (2009)
(defining and discussing "gender dysphoria").
137. 45 C.F.R. § 92.206 (2016).
138. Off. for Civ. Rts., Know Your Rights: Title IX Prohibits Sexual Harassment and Sexual
Violence Where You Go to School, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/title-ix-rights-201104.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
139. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31406 (May 18, 2016).
140. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 77 (1986).
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also with a larger duty to provide a safe environment where appropriate care can
be administered. Under Title V11,141 "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment"' constitutes
illegal discrimination. 142 Similarly, Title IX bars hostile environments that are
"sufficiently serious that [they] interfere[] with or limit[] a student's ability to
participate in or benefit from [a] school's program[s]." 143 The similarity between
the standards under Titles IX and VII reflects antidiscrimination law's concern
that educational institutions and employers have a large degree of power over
students and employees respectively, and that the market does not do a
particularly good job of punishing bad behavior in those contexts.
Analogizing from these standards, the ACA bars sufficiently severe or
pervasive harassment that disrupts or undermines a person's ability to participate
in care provision, 144 or to receive any benefits, services, or care by a medical
institution. Such a standard "requires neither asexuality nor androgyny" in the
care environment, nor does it "expand" section 1557 "into a general civility
code"' 145 requiring the highest standards of politeness or oft-maligned "safe
spaces." Rather, illegal harassing conduct creates a hostile environment only if
"the conduct is sufficiently serious to interfere with or limit an individual's
ability to participate in or benefit from a program." 14 6 Such a standard "cannot
be... a mathematically precise test."' 47 Rather, a court determines "whether an
environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' . . . only by looking at all the
circumstances," including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with" care provision. 48 Care
providers can subject transgender patients to a hostile environment through slurs
and offensive remarks, or through "inappropriate name or pronoun use, invasive
inquiries about.., genitalia, or transgender status, denial of access to the
restroom or housing facility.., use of epithets, and/or hostile or intimidating
141. Title IX very often follows Title VII litigation, and thus so does section 1557. See supra note
28.
142. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB
v. Vinson 477, U.S. 57, 65 (1986)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (2016) (explaining that a hostile
environment occurs if "submission to such conduct is made ... a term or condition of an individual's
employment").
143. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/listlocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
144. See 81 Fed. Reg. 31376, 31406 (May 18, 2016) ("[H]arassing conduct creates a hostile
environment if the conduct is sufficiently serious to interfere with or limit an individual's ability to
participate in or benefit from a program.").
145. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
146. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31406 (May 18, 2016)
(citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE A-2 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/aboutlofiices/listocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdl).
147. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
148. Id. at23.
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behavior."'149 Discrimination can also occur in the processes that precede actual
care provision, as when transgender patients are "forced to revert to the gender
[they] were assigned at birth in order to access healthcare, or hav[e] a dentist...
ask questions about [their] genitals." 50 Systematic harassment of transgender
patients through inappropriate gender pronoun use15 ' or social isolation in the
care environment on the basis of gender identity 52 can also constitute a hostile
care environment.
The district court in Rumble v. Fairview adopted a similar line of reasoning.
Mr. Rumble alleged that he encountered a medical environment that made him
"not feel safe" to the point that he "preferred to leave."' 53 Rumble alleges the
hostility began when his treating physician asked Rumble "hostile...
questions... [in] an attempt to embarrass" him, and also performed a painful
physical examination of his genitals, even after Rumble twice cried out for him
to stop. 154 The plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Steinman made comments that
"were ... indirect, offensive references to the Plaintiffs gender identity."' 55
Upon receiving his healthcare bill, the plaintiff noticed that it stated
"DIAGNOSIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PATIENT'S GENDER." 156
Rumble alleges that this environment "denied [him] the full and equal enjoyment
of an individual seeking professional and humane medical care from an
emergency room physician."' 5 7 Such a standard is not a bare minimum, but
rather depends on the context in which the harassment occurred: "[w]hether
gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable 'harassment' . . .depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships." 1
58
Further, Title IX-and thus the Affordable Care Act-adopts different
standards of liability depending on whether the harasser is an agent of the
institution. Thus, in Gebser v. Lago Vista, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
may not receive monetary damages from a school board that employed a teacher
unless the district "has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the
149. TRANSGENDER L. CTR., TRANSGENDER HEALTH AND THE LAW: IDENTIFYING AND FIGHTING
HEALTH CARE DISCRIMINATION 3 (2004).
150. Id.
151. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., No. 09-6460, 2011 WL 3648483
(E.D. La. Aug. 18,2011) (finding that repeatedly referring to a male worker by derogatory feminine names
and pronouns constituted illegal same-sex sexual harassment), rev'd, 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en
banc).
152. E.g., Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered [sic] Prisoners Caught in
the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 530 (2000).
153. Complaint at 11, Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 WL 1197415 (D.
Minn. June 20, 2014).
154. Id. at 8-9.
155. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at * 15 (D. Minn. Mar.
16, 2015).
156. Id. at *18.
157. Id. at *19.
158. Id. at *16 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651
(1999) (internal quotation omitted)).
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teacher's misconduct."159 The district may be notified if an "appropriate person"
or "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf...
fails adequately to respond." 160 In contrast, Title IX imposes a higher hurdle to
liability for student-on-student harassment. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, the Supreme Court held that liability could attach to a district based
on student-on-student harassment only if the district "acts with deliberate
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities," the
"harassment... is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit," and
the district has "substantial control over both the harassment and the context in
which the harassment occurs." 
161
In the healthcare context, a distinction similar to that between teacher and
fellow student is appropriate. For example, the same underlying policy
considerations apply to harassment of a student by a teacher as to harassment of
a patient by any agent of a clinic. Thus, although a clinical secretary may not be
providing what we normally think of as healthcare, any agent of the clinic is able
to deny the benefits of, or participation in, care provision through discrimination.
On the other hand, a hostile care environment promulgated by non-agents of the
clinic, such as fellow patients, aligns more closely with the Title IX standard for
student-on-student harassment because, although fellow patients are not able to
make substantive care decisions, they are able to create a hostile environment
that may effectively interfere with the benefits of care provision. In contrast,
because agents of the clinic serve as leaders of the care environment, they have
greater responsibility for ensuring that the clinical setting is discrimination-free.
In Rumble, the court determined that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged
Davis62 liability against the clinic for discrimination by an independent
contractor employed by the clinic, because
(1) [the doctor's] actions effectively barred Rumble's access to
reasonable, non-harassing medical care; (2) an appropriate person at [the
hospital] knew of [the doctor's] discriminatory acts; (3) [the hospital]
official acted with deliberate indifference to the discrimination; and (4)
[the hospital] ha[d] substantial control over [the doctor] and the
emergency room. 1
63
159. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
160. Id. at 290.
161. Davis, 526 U.S. at 630, 633.
162. Id. (holding that school boards may be liable under Title Ix for failing to stop student-on-
student harassment under certain circumstances).
163. Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *22 (D. Minn. Mar.
16, 2015).
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Because many American clinics have independently contracted care providers,
hostile care environment suits will likely center on this standard of liability for
plaintiffs seeking monetary damages.
Education litigation surrounding transgender students offers additional
theories of section 1557 discrimination by analogy. These suits largely center
around students' ability to access gendered spaces, such as locker rooms, or to
access certain gender-based activities, such as sports teams. For example, in a
landmark ruling, the Maine Supreme Court announced that the denial of access
to gender-appropriate spaces for a transgender student violated the Maine Human
Rights Act. 164 In a similar fashion, Title IX has increasingly begun to require
equal access to gender-exclusive programs, 165 like sports teams, 166 and NCAA
guidelines-although not binding-have begun to allow transgender student-
athletes to participate if certain qualifications are met. 167 Courts have also
granted relief on First Amendment grounds to transgender students asserting the
right to wear gender-appropriate clothing. 168 Hospitals, like schools, may violate
antidiscrimination provisions by denying transgender patients access to gender-
appropriate spaces, including bathrooms, by refusing to provide transgender
people gender-specific care like gynecology or urology, 169 or by restricting the
clothing transgender individuals may wear. 170
Educational institutions, especially colleges and universities, have a special
duty to protect students from sexual assault under Title X as well. 171 In fact, the
Department of Education has issued guidance to educational institutions on the
164. Doe v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2014); see also Mathis v. Fountain-Fort Carson
Scb. Dist. 8, Charge No. P20130034X (Col. Div. Civ. Rts. June 17, 2013),
http://www.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/doc-529.pdf (administrative decision under Colorado
law finding probable cause that student suffered illegal sex discrimination on the basis of her transgender
status).
165. See, e.g., Catherine E. Lhamon, Questions and Answers on Title lX and Sexual Violence, U.S.
DEP'T EDUC., OFF. CIV. RTS. 5 (Apr. 29, 2014) (noting that transgender students are protected on the basis
of sex from school violence by Title IX). But see Preliminary Injunction Order, Texas v. United States,
No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex. filed Aug. 21, 2016) (issuing preliminary injunction against enforcing
guidance opining that anti-sex-discrimination provisions protect transgender students).
166. Nicole Hensley, Minnesota Approves Equal Rights fbr Transgender Teens To Play High
School Sports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/minn-
transgender-teens-play-high-school-sports-article- 1.2034855.
167. Pat Griffin & Helen Carroll, NCAA Inclusion of TransgenderStudent-Athletes, NCAA OFF. OF
INCLUSION 13 (Apr. 2010),
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/TransgenderHandbook_201 LFinal.pdf.
168. See Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), aff'd
sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399
(Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
169. See supra Part 1II.
170. Although the First Amendment theory of liability does not apply to private clinics, restricting
gender-appropriate clothing still may constitute harassment.
171. Nick Anderson, 55 Colleges Under Title IX Probe Jbr Handling of Sexual Violence and
Harassment Claims, WASH. POST (May 1, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/federal-govemment-releases-list-of-55-colleges-
universities-under-title-ix-investigations-over-handling-of-sexual-violence/2014/05/01 /e0a7481 0-dI 3b-
I Ie3-937f-d3026234b51 c-story.html.
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subject of protecting transgender individuals from sexual violence. Clinics, as
sites of vulnerable patients, could theoretically incur similar liability for sex
discrimination through a failure-to-protect theory of sexual violence.
CONCLUSION
Although section 1557 is a welcome addition to antidiscrimination law,
much work has yet to be done to articulate what constitutes "discrimination" in
the healthcare context more broadly, as well as against transgender individuals
more narrowly. However, as courts, lawmakers, and regulators come to envision
anti-transgender discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, the ACA offers
fertile ground for advocates to curb discrimination in our nation's healthcare
system.

